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BIG BROTHER AND A LITTLE BLACK BOX: THE
EFFECT OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE ON
PRIVACY RIGHTS
David Uris*
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine driving alone down a barren roadway late at
night. You think that you are the only car on the road, when
suddenly another vehicle comes roaring across the intersec-
tion. Before you have time to apply the brakes, the opposing
car smashes into your side, spiraling both you and the other
driver into a frenzied tailspin. Unfortunately, there are no
eyewitnesses at the scene to verify that the other driver ran a
red light. Without a bystander present, the most incriminat-
ing evidence against the other driver has been eliminated,
and the disposition of your case will ultimately rest with the
subjectivity of jurors whom you have never laid eyes on. In a
court of law, it would be your word against his, and the ulti-
mate judgment would depend upon whomever the jury felt
told a more convincing story. As you enter the discovery
phase of litigation, you learn that the other driver is planning
to call an eyewitness on his behalf, one declaring that you
were going 20 miles per hour over the speed limit. How could
this be, you ask yourself, when you were the only two drivers
within ten miles of the accident? Even more unbelievable is
the fact that the alleged eyewitness about to be called to the
stand was a passenger in your own car! Obviously there must
be some kind of mistake.
The jury listens as you explain to the court how the other
driver ran a red light. Your case consists only of a detailed
recollection of the night's events from your point of view. The
* Technical Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 42. J.D., Santa
Clara University School of Law; B.A., University of California, Santa Barbara.
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other driver begins to present his case. He declares that it
was you who ran the red light, and it was impossible to avoid
the collision due to the fact you were driving at a speed of
fifty miles-per-hour in a thirty mile-per-hour zone. He calls
his witness, and in immaculate detail, it describes the veloc-
ity of your car during the last five seconds before impact,
whether the brakes were applied, how the airbag fared, the
angle of the steering wheel, and even whether you were wear-
ing your seatbelt.1 Unbelievable, you think to yourself, how
another person could have such impressive knowledge about
the intricacies of your own car! After a quick jury delibera-
tion, you are found liable for the accident and all injuries; a
result directly attributable to the credibility of a voiceless
"witness" stashed underneath your car's dashboard that is
about the size of a carton of cigarettes.2
The "black box,"3 otherwise known as a "Sensing and Di-
agnostic Module," was one of six million that have been
placed inside a variety of General Motors cars since 1990.'
What perhaps makes their emergence so mystifying is that
many drivers have been kept completely in the dark as to
their existence until now. The black box derives from the air-
lines' use of flight data recorders, which the National High-
way Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA") proved were
valuable in understanding and decreasing the number of air-
line crashes.5 In evaluating the scene of a plane crash with
no survivors present, black boxes have proved instrumental
1. See Wired News, Are Vehicle "Black Boxes" a Black Hole for Privacy?, at
http://www.aclu.org/news/1999/w06o399a.html (June 3, 1999).
2. Hannah Wolfson, Driving Home Safety Issues: Black Box for Cars on the
Horizon, ABCNEWS.com, at
http://www.abcnews.go.com/sections/tech/DailyNews/
blackboxOO0613.html (June 13, 2000).
3. The term "black box," coined in 1945, originally referred to any compli-
cated electronic device that was incomprehensible to the user. See John H.
Lienhard, Engines of our Ingenuity- No. 1482: Black Box, at
http://www.uh.edu/engines/epi1482.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2002).
4. Matthew L. Wald, Car "Black Box" Reveals Details from Accidents, N.Y.
Times on the Web, May 30, 1999 at
http://www.nytimes.com/library/nationa/053099car-black-box.html (May 30,
1999) (describing GM's motive for implementing the black box as being to refine
its on-board safety system and wanting the information to show what a driver's
behavior is in the moments before a crash).
5. Michael LaEnvi, The "Black Box"- Well Folks, It's Really Silver!, C5 Cor-
vette Performance Center, at http://www.c5-corvette.congm-blackbox.htm
(Sept. 1999).
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in providing researchers with information as to why such
crashes occurred. Finding their way into cars, black boxes
continue to extrapolate often impossible to get information by
yielding critical facts about crashes, especially when there are
no eyewitnesses available.6 The advantages of having such a
device, however, comes with a certain degree of caution, for
since these boxes may be the only unbiased eyewitness's at
the scene of an accident, the data will inevitably end up in the
hands of the police and could be subpoenaed in a lawsuit.7
But just how reliable are these boxes, and what performance
standards should the government impose upon car manufac-
turers?8
This comment analyzes black box technology in automo-
biles for the purpose of determining whether their use in the
courtroom, as presented by expert witnesses, should be per-
mitted. Part II delineates the history and purpose behind
black box technology, from its inauguration on airplanes to its
recent automotive version.9 Part II also discusses the histori-
cal climate surrounding Federal Rule of Evidence 702("Rule
702")" and its role in allowing such novel evidence into the
courtroom." Part III addresses the controversy surrounding
the admissibility of black box data evidence and the signifi-
cance of the problem to the legal community. 2 Part IV ad-
dresses Rule 702 in detail and presents the relevant factors
for determining whether expert testimony of black box data is
sufficiently reliable to be considered by the trier of fact and
what privacy issues must be overcome." Part V discusses
what proposals should be adopted to ensure that uniformity
and justice prevail. 4 The comment concludes that while this
advanced technology does have the potential to revolutionize
accident research, courts ought to be cautious about allowing
6. See Ann Ferrar, Black Boxes Come Down to Earth, APBnews.com, at
http://www.apbonline.com/safetycenter/transport/2000/03/16/blackboxes0316_01
.html (Mar. 16, 2000).
7. See id.; Wired News, supra note 1.
8. See Ferrar, supra note 6 (discussing that how well the devices perform is
at the discretion of each manufacturer).
9. See discussion infra Parts II.A-B.
10. FED. R. EVID. 702 (eff. Dec. 1, 2000).
11. See discussion infra Part II.C.
12. See discussion infra Part III.
13. See discussion infra Parts IV.A-C.
14. See discussion infra Part V.
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its use in litigation. 5 Expert testimony of black box data
should be the product of reliable principles and methods in
the community, and experts themselves should be impartial
and unaffiliated with the car manufacturer. 6 The standardi-
zation of black box technology in all automobiles should like-
wise be seen as a paramount goal. Without such procedural
safeguards, the boxes should be used solely for safety re-
search, for their potential to influence the jury's decision is
simply too damaging to our judicial system.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Origins of the "Black Box"
The British built the first jet-powered airliner, the
"Comet," following the rapid expansion of jet fighter produc-
tion during World War II."7 But it appeared as if the Comet
was cursed, and in 1953 a number of them crashed unac-
countably, placing skepticism in the public's mind about the
safety of jets and the cause of the accidents. 8 Unfortunately,
no evidence could be found amongst all the debris. 9 As David
Warren2 listened to the debate of possible causes, he had the
idea of producing new technology that would record the flight
crew's conversation to protect the record and survive a
crash.2 He reasoned that recording the conversation of the
flight crew during the emergency might provide a mechanism
for tracing the cause of the crash." After discussing his idea
candidly with other chemists specializing in aircrafts and
15. See discussion infra Part VI.
16. See generally Wald, supra note 4; FED. R. EVID. 702.
17. See Department of Defense, The Black Box: An Australian Contribution
to Air Safety, The Defence Science and Technology Organization ("DSTO"), at
http://www.dsto.defence.gov.au/corporate/history/jubilee/blackbox.html (last vis-
ited Mar. 15, 2002). The Comet revolutionized air travel, slashing flight times
and entrancing passengers with its smooth, quiet flight. Macarthur Job, David
Warren, TIME.com, at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/intl/article/0,9171,1107991025-
33686,00.html (Oct. 25, 1999).
18. See id.
19. Id. Many professional committees discussed the possible cause at end-
less meetings, knowing that the cause of the crashes had to be found or the
Comet would be doomed to failure. See id.
20. David Warren was a chemist specializing in aircraft fuels at the Aero-
nautical Research Laboratories in Melbourne, Australia. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id.
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finding that it generated little notoriety, he outlined his pro-
posal in a report entitled "A Device for Assisting Investigation
into Aircraft Accidents."23 The report also yielded little inter-
est, so Warren decided that a black box demonstration unit
needed to be produced.24
Warren designed a unit capable of recording four hours of
pilot voice and instrument readings up to the moment of any
accident. 25 Although the new technology tested successfully
in the air, the criticism of countless aviation authorities was
nonetheless dispiriting. 26 The Federation of Air Pilots de-
clared that it would be like "a spy flying alongside... [be-
cause] no plane would take off in Australia with Big Brother
listening." 7 Opinions changed, however, when Sir Robert
Hardingham28 arranged for Warren to take the "Flight Mem-
ory ",2 to England for demonstrations."° The British reception
was so overwhelmingly favorable that authorities sought to
make the recorders a permanent fixture in all British civil
aircraft.3' Warren was given a team32 to update the initial
23.. See Department of Defense, supra note 17. See also Kristy Forward,
The Design and Use of a Black Box Recorder and Cockpit Voice Recorder, at
http://www.bath.ac.uk/-en9klf/fdr.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2002) (discussing
how the report was widely disseminated throughout the aviation industry).
24. See Department of Defense, supra note 17. It was decided that "show
and tell" would be more effective than "tell", so a demonstration unit was
needed. Id.
25. See id.
26. See id. Australian civil authorities replied that "Dr. Warren's instru-
ment has little immediate direct use in civil aircraft." Id. This widespread local
disinterest may have been attributed to the fact that Australia had not experi-
enced a major air accident for years and was recognized as having the world's
best safety standard at that time. See id.
27. Id. It was considered that "such a device [was] not required... the re-
corder would yield more expletives than explanations." Id.
28. Sir Robert Hardingham was the Secretary of the United Kingdom Air
Registration Board. See id. The Air Registration Board ("ARB") is now known
as the Certification Authority. United Kingdom Air Accidents Branch, Inspec-
tor's Investigations (Formal Reports), at
http://www.aaib.dtlr.gov.uk/formal]garpi/garpi.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2002).
29. "Flight Memory" is the shortened name for "The ARL Flight Memory
Unit", the project name for Warren's device. See id.
30. Id. The reason for Sir Hardingham's desire to arrange for Warren to
take the recorder to England was because of his unbridled enthusiasm for the
device, and not because of any difficulties Britain was encountering with unsafe
civil aviation. See id.
31. Id.
32. The team was comprised of Lane Sear, Ken Fraser and Walter Boswell.
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model to a pre-production standard that improved upon the
original in a number of ways.33
Australia eventually became a leading proponent of the
technology due to the mysterious crash of an airliner in Mac-
kay, Queensland, in 1960. 34  Inquiring into the crash, the
judge was told of the development of the crash recorder, who
then ordered that as of January 1963, all Australian airliners
carry recorders for pilot speech.35 By 1967, although the
United Kingdom and other countries implemented the re-
cording of flight instrument data, Australia became the first
country to make compulsory both flight data and cockpit voice
recording.36 The Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA")
subsequently made flight data recorders mandatory in 1964. 37
As David Warren had foreseen, what would ultimately be re-
ferred to as the black box was now a staple of the aviation in-
dustry, proving to be more invaluable than anyone had ever
imagined.38
B. Black Boxes in Automobiles
Traditional methods of investigating car crashes include
measuring and documenting evidence such as tire marks, im-
pact areas, final vehicle resting positions, driver and witness
statements, and vehicle damage.39 But the conclusions de-
rived from the investigation are obviously limited by the
33. See id. (describing how the "pre-production" prototype ARL Flight Mem-
ory Recorder had a separate crash-and-fire-proof container for mounting in the
tail of the aircraft). Improvements to the original "ARL Flight Memory Unit"
included a method of recording instrument readings with greater accuracy and
at an increased rate of 24 readings per second. Id.
34. See id.
35. Id.
36. See id.
37. FAA Flight Data Recorder Rule, 14 C.F.R. §129.20 (1964). This federal
regulation states that "no person may operate an aircraft under this part that is
registered in the United States unless it is equipped with one or more approved
flight recorders that use a digital method of recording and storing data and a
method of readily retrieving that data from the storage medium." Id.
38. Department of Defense, supra note 17.
39. See Timothy Staab, "Black Box" Technology and GM Vehicles, Delta
Analysis, at http://www.deltacrash.com/article.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2002).
Delta Analysis is dedicated to providing professional traffic accident reconstruc-
tion services in an impartial, honest, fair and ethical manner. See id. (This ex-
planation comes from the web page of Delta Analysis at
http://www.deltacrash.com/aboutus.htm).
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amount and quality of available information.4" Time and
again, accident investigators are forced to deal with less-than-
ideal conditions and inadequate time and resources to gather
evidence.4" And since traffic collisions occur instantaneously,
witness statements (if there are any) may or may not be accu-
rate.42
In aircraft, black boxes tell what happens behind the
scenes: what the pilot was doing and saying, and the condi-
tion of the plane in the moments before the crash.43 And now,
given advancements in technology, they are finding their way
into automobiles. 4  Technically named Event Data Retrieval
Units ("ERUDs"), they are constantly "on," but only record
data occurring in the last five seconds before a crash.45 At
impact, the device also records the velocity of the crash it-
self.46 The National Transportation Safety Board ("NTSB")
has suggested that the NHTSA and automobile manufactur-
ers work together to collect data on automobile accidents by
using the black boxes, and proposed that they be required in
all vehicles.47 Many individuals, however, oppose these de-
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. Ferrar, supra note 6.
44. See id.
45. Id. Within milliseconds of a collision, a vehicle's Sensing and Diagnostic
Module ("SDM") senses the crash severity and determines whether to deploy the
airbags, and once the airbags are deployed, the record is permanently stored.
Id. Newer GM airbag modules have the added capability of recording crash
data even when a vehicle's airbag doesn't deploy. Id.
46. See id. In recording the "velocity of the crash," the black box is only able
to record the speed of the car in which the black box is located. See id. There-
fore, the black box ostensibly only tells one side of the story.
47. See Augustus Chidester, John Hinch, Thomas Mercer & Keith Schultz,
Recording Automotive Crash Event Data, International Symposium on Trans-
portation Recorders, at
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/problems/studies/record/chidester.htm (May 3-5,
1999); LaEnvi, supra note 5; Michael Cicchese, NTSB Likely to Recommend
Black Boxes on All Highway Vehicles, Inside ATA (American Trucking Associa-
tions), at http://www.truckline.com/insideata/2000mce/coverage/blackbox.html
(Oct. 29, 2000). The recommendation that data recorders be required on all
highway vehicles came from an NTSB official, Joseph Osterman, during an edu-
cational session at the Management Conference and Exhibition. See id. (The
Management Conference and Exhibition is an annual event for the trucking in-
dustry that focuses on national issues affecting the trucking industry.). Oppos-
ing Osterman's view was Donald Massey, a partner with the law firm of Adams
and Reese in New Orleans, who proclaimed that 'if data recorders are going to
be a primary tool in accident investigations, then information needs to come
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
vices because they are concerned about the possible legal im-
plications, invasion of privacy, and increased cost to consum-
ers.48
General Motors ("GM") has installed these devices in
many of its cars to collect information when the cars are in-
volved in accidents.5 Since 1974, GM automobiles equipped
with airbags have recorded crash data for impacts that
caused the airbag to deploy. ° Design engineers have likewise
utilized this information to enhance the operation of airbag
sensing systems, and NHTSA researchers have used it to fa-
miliarize themselves with the field performance of alternative
airbag system designs. 1 Commencing with the 1999 model
year, some GM automobiles have the added ability of re-
cording the speed at which the vehicle was traveling before
the crash, the RPMs of the engine, and even how much pres-
sure was being applied to the gas or if the driver attempted to
brake.52 A recently developed model of the box being installed
in hundreds of thousands of GM cars can ascertain, for exam-
ple, exactly when the driver applied the brakes: five seconds,
three seconds, or just one second before impact.53 It can even
tell whether the driver was wearing his or her seat belt.54 The
data boxes assure a treasure chest of never before obtainable
information, not only serving to re-construct accident scenes,
but enabling designers to build safer and more efficient
automobiles.55
In 1998, GM contracted with Vetronix56 Corporation of
from all vehicles involved in the collision." Id.
48. David Barnes, Commentary: The Debate on "Black Boxes", Transport
Topics, at http://www.ttnews.com/members/printEdition/0003883.html (Mar. 1,
2000) (This statement was in direct reference to the installation of black boxes
on trucks to monitor compliance with hours-of-service laws. Unionized carriers
say their records show they comply with federal limits on driving hours, making
the recorders unnecessary.).
49. See Drivers.com Staff, Black Boxes are Already in Automobiles, and
Your Car May Have One!, Drivers.com, at http://www.drivers.con/cgi-bin/
go.cgi?type=ART&id=000000248&static=l (Nov. 2, 1999).
50. See Chidester, supra note 47. See also LaEnvi, supra note 5.
51. See Chidester, supra note 47. See also LaEnvi, supra note 5.
52. Chidester, supra note 47. See also LaEnvi, supra note 5.
53. Wald, supra note 4.
54. Id.
55. See id.
56. Vetronix is a leading proponent and manufacturer of vehicle diagnostic
equipment. See Staab, supra note 39. Injury Sciences LLC is also trying to de-
code data during an automobile crash. See Joe Frey, "Black Boxes" Will Aid in
1002 [Vol. 42
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Santa Barbara, California to commercially develop software
and interface cables that allow investigators, researchers, and
anyone else with a laptop to interrogate the box.57 This is
made possible by use of a product called CDR, which
downloads and converts data from a vehicle's black box into a
decipherable format on a laptop computer or PC.58 The reality
of this technology is that whereas traditionally, accident re-
constructionists would piece together crash information,
claim adjustors will now have access to such information on
their laptops.59 While still in the production mode, an innova-
tive software entitled WrExpert6' could allow claims profes-
sionals to be better equipped to evaluate conflicting stories
regarding an accident or related injuries and determine what
facts and circumstances are objectively supported by the ve-
hicle black box data.6'
While other automakers have purportedly equipped their
vehicles with recordable airbag modules, GM is presently the
only automaker to make crash data and data recovery tools
accessible to researchers and investigators.62 "WrExpert" will
enable third parties such as auto insurance companies to as-
certain what the speed of a vehicle was prior to impact, what
the severity of the impact was, and what injuries, if any,
should be expected.63 This will ultimately serve to help insur-
ers root out fraud. 4
Nearly all automakers are reluctant to make this capabil-
ity available to others due to concern over how the informa-
tion will be used in court and the prospect of increased law-
suits. 65 GM's view is that "the potential for improvements in
Auto Collision Injury Analysis, Insure.com, at
http://www.insure.com/auto/collision/blackboxl000.html (Oct. 3, 2000).
57. See Staab, supra note 39. (The system GM and Vetronix have con-
tracted for is the second generation of the original 'Event Data Retrieval Unit"
that Vetronix developed in 1990 exclusively for GM's internal use.).
58. Frey, supra note 56.
59. Id. This technology is allegedly the first product to allow a layperson to
examine forensic science data. Id.
60. Id. "WrExpert" will purportedly interface with Vetronix's crash data
technology to give claim adjusters insight into many important crash-related
questions. See id.
61. Id. It is further noted that WrExpert's price will vary greatly based on
the number of adjusters in an insurer's claims department. See id.
62. Staab, supra note 39.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. While an increase in litigation has not been statistically proven and
2002] 1003
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auto safety outweigh any possible increase in litigation."6'
C. "General Acceptance" and Federal Rule 702
With such advanced technology comes the need for a
qualified expert to explain the evidence. Analyzing the pre-
sent state of expert witness testimony in the federal court
system calls for a discussion of the 1923 case of Frye v. United
States and the "general acceptance standard."67 Faced with
judging the evidentiary strength of a novel scientific tech-
nique, the trial court refused to admit expert testimony based
on the test results of an early polygraph." On review, the
court of appeals affirmed, finding that the polygraph was a
"new scientific technique incapable of being sufficiently estab-
lished in the scientific community to justify its admissibil-
ity.' 9
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,7 the
Supreme Court established a new test for judging the admis-
sibility of scientific expert testimony by rejecting the exclu-
sive use of "general acceptance."7 Daubert thus effectively re-
formed the manner in which judges determine the
admissibility of scientific testimony.7 The new test, as articu-
lated by the U.S. Supreme Court, requires that reliable tes-
timony be grounded in the "methods and procedures of sci-
ence" and that the judge be given more latitude in assessing
whether to allow expert testimony in the courtroom."' In ad-
is only speculative in nature, challengers to black box technology maintain that
this is a strong deterrent for allowing its use in the courtroom. See id.
66. Id.
67. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The test provides
that scientific expert testimony will be inadmissible unless it has "gained gen-
eral acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs." Id. at 1014.
68. Id. at 1013.
69. Id. at 1014.
70. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
71. See generally Daubert, 509 U.S. 579 (1993). See, e.g., Mark McCormick,
Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to Admissibility, 67 IOWA L. REV.
879 (1982); Andre A. Moenssens, Admissibility of Scientific Evidence-An Alter-
native to the Frye Rule, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 545 (1984).
72. See generally Daubert, 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Many state courts have fol-
lowed after the Federal Rules of Evidence. See, e.g., State v. Alberico, 861 P.2d
192, 202-03 (N.M. 1993).
73. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590. Justice Blackmun asserts that he is "con-
fident that federal judges possess the capacity to undertake [the] review" of al-
lowing expert testimony in the courtroom. Id. at 593. The "trial judge must de-
termine at the outset ... whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1)
1004 [Vol. 42
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dition, evidence must relate directly to an issue in the case."
Consequently, when the trial court evaluates the admissibil-
ity of expert testimony, it must determine whether the evi-
dence is reliable and helpful. The proponent has the burden
of establishing that the pertinent admissibility requirements
are met by a preponderance of the evidence.75
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE LEGAL PROBLEM
In comparison to black box recorders on planes, whose ex-
istence is supported by federal regulation, black boxes in cars
are manifesting themselves in a completely untested area of
law.7" While the NTSB recommended that auto manufactur-
ers work together with the NHTSA to gather information on
traffic collisions using onboard crash recording devices, no
law requires the installation of these recorders.77
GM has been using the information by and large to per-
fect its on-board safety systems, and wants the information
from the newer boxes to have the ability to show the conduct
of a typical driver seconds before a crash." The opportunity
to have information that previously was not available, how-
ever, will inevitably lead to its use in the courtroom." But in-
terpretation of a device with no standard for accuracy will
only create ambiguity in the law and unwarranted confusion
in the legal system. A program that produces reliable conver-
sion of the data is analogous to bringing in the best eyewit-
ness available, but the role an expert plays in explaining the
data from a recovered black box to a jury must be scrutinized
scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or deter-
mine a fact in issue." Id. at 592.
74. Id. at 591. This new test, as applied by the Supreme Court, gave judges
many factors to consider in determining admissibility: scientific studies of the
testimony's underlying basis, publication in scholarly scientific journals, favor-
able rates of error and standards of measurability, and the retaining of a place
for "general acceptance." See id. The Court, however, outwardly rejected exclu-
sive use of the general acceptance test. See id. at 588.
75. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (Advisory Committee's Note to 2000 Amendment).
See also FED. R. EVID. 104(a) (describing that "preliminary questions concern-
ing the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or
the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court . . ."); Bourjaily v.
United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
76. Wald, supra note 4.
77. Staab, supra note 39.
78. Wald, supra note 4.
79. See id.
2002] 1005
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closely. Analysis of both Federal Rule 702 and the general
acceptance standard will thus play an instrumental role in
determining whether black box data may be used as evidence
in a lawsuit.
The black box system also raises sensitive privacy ques-
tions. Pervasive "Big Brother-like" issues exist, including
what law enforcement or insurance companies will do with
this information, who actually owns this information and who
has the right to access it.8' Does the auto manufacturer own
the rights because they were the ones to install it? Do these
rights transfer to the consumer once the car has been signed
over? Or is there a more pressing need for the government to
obtain control in order to effectuate a uniform standard of
safety akin to the airline industry? While GM claims the de-
vices are to be used solely for safety research, skeptics can
only hope that these devices do not turn out to be Pandora's
boxes, for "the loss of personal civil liberties always begins
with the best intentions of our government."'
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Black Box Evidence and "General Acceptance". Why Frye
Doesn't Apply
The Frye test has garnered its fair share of popular sup-
port and criticism.8 Proponents of the general acceptance
standard value the idea that scientists in a particular field
are guaranteed the power to determine whether to allow
novel evidence into the courtroom, for they are the ones most
able to ascertain a process' reliability.8 By also minimizing
the latitude given to individual judges, proponents argue that
consistency will be promoted in the judicial process. 4 How-
ever, challengers of Frye are quick to condemn its propensity
80. Staab, supra note 39.
81. Bob Van Voris, Black Box Car Idea Opens Can of Worms, NAT'L L.J.,
June 7, 1999, at 1; see also Wired News, supra note 1.
82. See, e.g., James E. Starrs, "A Still-Life Watercolor": Frye v. United
States, 27 J. FORENSIC SCI. 684, 685 (1982); People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240,
1245 (Cal. 1970) (describing that the "primary advantage.., of Frye lies in its
essentially conservative nature ...).
83. See generally John D. Borders, Jr., Fit to be Fryed: Frye v. United States
and the Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence, 77 KY. L.J. 849 (Sept./Oct.
1989).
84. See People v. Kelly, 549 P. 2d 1240 (Cal. 1970).
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to deprive juries of relevant evidence. 5 They argue that Frye
rewards science that is old and antiquated, leaving no room
for the novel scientific techniques being discovered at the
moment." Whether Frye compels the judge to observe gen-
eral acceptance in the testimony's scientific basis or simply in
the method applying that foundation remains uncertain.87
The Frye court would not be expected to support the ad-
missibility of black box evidence, even though the historical
origins of the black box date back to the early 1960s.88 The
FAA has crafted a federal regulation enforcing the use of
black box recorders on all aircraft, yet the same cannot be
said of methods that apply for automobile usage. The devices
are designed to measure completely different things, given
the varying complexities of the airplane versus the automo-
bile. Black boxes in airplanes are designed to trace accidents
to a single cause, and the NTSB investigates its contents for
the purpose of improving safety in all commercial aircraft.
But black boxes in automobiles, while designed for equally
noble purposes, record different things.89 Just as polygraph
evidence was deemed inadmissible in Frye for being a novel
scientific technique not "sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it
85. See Paul C. Gianelli, Background Paper Prepared for the National Con-
ference of Lawyers and Scientists, 99 F.R.D. 189, 192 (1983) (citing Coppolino v.
State, 223 So. 2d 68 (Fla. App. 1968)).
86. See, e.g., Frederic I. Lederer, Resolving the Frye Dilemma -A Reliability
Approach, 115 F.R.D. 84, 86 (1987).
87. See United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978) ("A
determination of reliability cannot rest solely on a process of 'counting (scien-
tific) noses.'"). In the Williams case:
Williams presents a list of 10 scientists classified as favoring use of
spectrographic analysis in the courtroom and 17 scientists classified as
opposed. Williams admits, however, that there are differing shades of
opinion within each classification, and that many names could be
added to each. Selection of the "relevant scientific community," ap-
pears to influence the result .... [Therefore,] [i]n testing for admissi-
bility of a particular type of scientific evidence, whatever the scientific
"voting" pattern may be, the courts cannot in any event surrender to
scientists the responsibility for determining the reliability of that evi-
dence.
Id.
88. See FAA Flight Data Recorder Rule, 14 C.F.R. §129.20 (1964).
89. See supra Part II.B. Some vehicle black boxes record the speed at which
the vehicle was traveling before the crash, the RPMs of the engine, and even
how much pressure was being applied to the gas or if the driver attempted to
brake. See supra Part II.B.
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belongs,"9 black box data in automobiles presents the same
problems in that it is technology that has only recently been
implemented in automobiles. Therefore, while black box
technology has existed since the 1960s, Frye would likely
treat its usage in automobiles as novel and not an extension
of the historically rooted flight data recorders.9'
Likewise, the promotion of consistency in the judicial
process, seen as a paramount objective of Frye, would lose its
commanding authority.9 With the automobile manufacturer
being the exclusive interpreter of its own data, the notion of
fairness and impartiality would compromise the judicial proc-
ess.9 For example, in a current suit against GM brought by
the family of a former professional football player who was
killed in his Corvette in a car accident in 1992, it was argued
that the recorder in the car proved that the crash was caused
by the airbag deploying when the car hit a pothole. 4 But GM
disagreed, and because most lawyers and crash specialists
knew little about the recorders, it was difficult to question
GM's own assessment of the accident.9 It is true, however,
that Vetronix96 has been instrumental in lessening the degree
of ignorance considerably by allowing independent research-
ers an opportunity to study the results. But a GM specialist
will nevertheless continue to be the only true expert regard-
ing GM black boxes. The concept of general acceptance in the
scientific community, as articulated by Frye, could hardly
have envisioned GM specialists being called into court to in-
terpret data in a lawsuit filed against themselves, for the in-
herent conflict of interest would be insurmountable. There-
fore, something other than the Frye test must be used to
allow black box evidence into the courtroom.
B. Black Box Evidence and "Reliability" The Daubert
Dilemma
Rule 702 has been amended in recognition of Daubert,
90. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
91. Id. (The 1964 FAA Flight Data Recorder Rule shows that flight record-
ers have been in existence for over 35 years, leading to its well-established rec-
ognition in the scientific community.).
92. See id.
93. See Wald, supra note 4.
94. Id.
95. See id.
96. See Staab, supra note 39.
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which charged trial judges with the responsibility of acting as
gatekeepers to exclude unreliable expert testimony.97 In as-
sessing the reliability of scientific expert testimony, future
trial courts were thus given a number of factors to consider.98
The factors listed by the Daubert Court were (1) whether the
expert's technique or theory can be or has been tested- that is,
whether the expert's theory can be challenged in some objec-
tive sense, or whether it is instead simply a subjective, con-
clusory approach that cannot reasonably be assessed for reli-
ability; (2) whether the technique or theory has been subject
to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential
rate of error of the technique or theory when applied; (4) the
existence and maintenance of standards and controls; and (5)
whether the technique or theory has been generally accepted
in the scientific community.99 This last factor (5) is essen-
tially the Frye rule, although in Daubert it is only a factor to
be subjectively considered by the judge. 00 As a result, it is
important to examine these factors judiciously in order to un-
derstand how Rule 702 applies to the current state of GM's
black box data.
An important element that judges use to determine the
admissibility of expert testimony is whether the expert's the-
ory can be challenged in some objective sense. 10 ' Vetronix has
now made it possible for researchers to evaluate the reliabil-
ity of GM's data, and even though GM continues to be the
only true expert for interpreting its own box,10 2 a judge will
have substantial discretion in determining on a case-by-case
basis whether particular expert testimony is reliable."3 This
is in stark contrast to the Frye court, which only allowed ex-
pert testimony regarding evidence that was generally ac-
cepted in the scientific community."' A novel device, such as
GM's black box, can now be tested by third parties, and gen-
97. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); see also
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 156-57 (1999) (citing the Commit-
tee Note to the Proposed Amendment to Rule 702, which had been released for
public comment before the date of the Kumho decision). See supra Part II.C.
98. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (Advisory Committee's Note to 2000 Amendment).
99. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94.
100. See generally Daubert, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
101. See FED. R. EVID. 702.
102. See supra Part IV.A.
103. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999).
104. See supra Part W.A.
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eral acceptance in the scientific community is no longer a con-
straint on the admissibility of black box data.' °' In fact, Rule
702 is now broad enough to allow contradictory expert testi-
mony that is the product of competing principles or methods
in the same field of expertise.' 6 Whereas GM might call an
expert to testify to the precision of its data, a third party can
try to impeach this by testifying to the appropriateness of its
own analysis. Proponents "do not have to demonstrate to the
judge by a preponderance of the evidence that the assess-
ments of their experts are correct," but only that their "opin-
ions are reliable . . .""'
But it is this very trend of admitting the entire spectrum
of expert testimony that makes Rule 702 problematic for
black box evidence. Independent experts, unaffiliated with
GM, might testify that the methods they independently used
were reliable and accurate. Rule 702 even allows such testi-
mony when the methods are recognized by only a small num-
ber of scientists practicing in that field.' ° This is significant
in the sense that GM will not be permitted to monopolize
black box expert testimony. However, a GM expert will be
able to testify using the same lowered evidentiary standards,
and the trier of fact in a case using such evidence will be
forced to weigh one theory over another. The GM expert will
have an advantage, for the complexities of a product designed
by GM will be perceived by the jury (or trier of fact) as only
being completely understood by an affiliated GM specialist.
Rule 702 in effect allows in expert testimony, however recog-
nized in a scientific field,' and allows the trier of fact to de-
termine its legitimacy. The term "reliability" as used in Rule
702 is therefore nothing but a smokescreen, for if a method
can be recognized as reliable simply by a "minority of scien-
105. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594 (describing how the varying factors applied
by judges were neither exclusive nor dispositive).
106. See generally FED. R. EVID. 702 (The 2000 Amendment provides that an
expert may testify when such testimony is derived from sufficient data.). See,
e.g., Heller v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 167 F.3d 146, 160 (3d Cir. 1999) (describing
how expert testimony cannot be excluded simply because the expert uses one
test rather than another, when both tests are accepted in the field and both
reach reliable results); Ruiz-Troche v. Pepsi Cola, 161 F.3d 77, 85 (1st Cir. 1988)
(holding that "Daubert neither requires nor empowers trial courts to determine
which of several competing scientific theories has the best provenance").
107. In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation, 35 F.3d 717, 744 (3d Cir. 1994).
108. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1318 (9th Cir. 1995).
109. See supra Part IV.B.
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tists,""° the method becomes increasingly subjective."' An
automobile manufacturer could set completely prejudiced
standards for evaluation of its black box data, thereby favor-
ing its chances in a lawsuit where a defect in the car is al-
leged to be the cause of the crash. Since the "evidentiary re-
quirement of reliability is lower than the merits standard for
correctness," the manufacturer would simply need to prove by
a preponderance of the evidence that its own experts' opinions
are reliable."2
GM is currently the only automaker to make its black box
data available to researchers and investigators.1 ' If this
trend continues, there will be no measuring stick by which to
compare GM black boxes with those of other manufacturers.
Recognizing one standard while refusing to acknowledge oth-
ers does not promote fairness in the judicial system. Take the
following example: the driver of a Toyota automobile accuses
the driver of a GM vehicle with speeding or some other viola-
tion after a crash. It would simply be unjust for the driver of
the GM car to bring in his own data to exonerate himself.
Even if the Toyota driver brought in its own expert, it would
have to convince a jury that its expert was more reliable than
GM's expert and GM's black box. The data from black boxes
is as powerful as "DNA in paternity suits and murder cases,"
and allowing uncontested evidence of this caliber into the
courtroom offsets the balance of power of competing parties in
a lawsuit."'
C. The Privacy Factor
Critics and consumer advocates protest that by providing
in-car surveillance systems, GM is potentially depriving indi-
viduals of their personal privacy."' The information will
quickly get out of the control of the vehicle owner, leading to a
future in which civil liberties may be a thing of the past."'
The unit is menacing not because of the data it collects, but
110. See supra Part LV.B.
111. Rule 702 requires, among other things, that "the testimony is the prod-
uct of reliable principles and methods." FED. R. EVID. 702.
112. See In re Paoli, 35 F.3d at 744.
113. See supra Part II.B.
114. Wald, supra note 4.
115. See Wired News, supra note 1.
116. See id.
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because of the potential uses of that information."'
One of the main problems with GM's black box is that
they were installed without the consumer's consent."8 Just in
the last month, a suit has been filed against GM claiming
that the company failed to tell motorists about the existence
of the recorders, saying the devices are aimed solely at help-
ing to design safer cars and to help investigators in accident
reconstruction."9 A common complaint is that the recording
of car crash data raises "very troubling questions about in-
formed consent."'2 ° GM is steadfast in proclaiming that their
policy is to "get the vehicle owner's permission" before the
data is accessible, but this logic is confounding given the
number of recorders presently installed in automobiles and
the number of consumers who have been kept in the dark."'
Some regulatory questions remain unanswered. For ex-
ample, should owners be told before purchasing their car
about the existence of the black box?' 22 While GM cites "re-
search" and "safety" as being the predominant objectives of
the box, there are other workable devices on the market that
might provide similar results without eroding personal pri-
vacy."' A device called AutoWatch 4 might be one step in the
right direction. AutoWatch is a gadget that takes only sec-
onds to attach under the steering wheel, connecting to a car's
electrical system and recording speed and distance traveled."'
117. See id. (GM has stated that its "Sensing and Diagnostic Module" is used
only for aggregate crash research, and poses no threat to consumer privacy. But
one nonetheless has to question a device that has been shrouded in so much se-
crecy.).
118. See id.
119. See Andrew Thomas, Car Black Box Privacy Threat, THE REGISTER, at
http://www.theregister.co.uk/content/2/15393.html (Dec. 12, 2000). The com-
plaint involves eight 1999 U.S. models of GM cars: the Chevrolet Corvette and
Camaro; the Pontiac Firebird; the Cadillac DeVille, El Dorado, and Seville; and
the Buick Century and Park Avenue. See id. The modules in the Cadillac De-
Ville also record speed, engine RPM, brake and throttle data. See id.
120. Id.
121. Id. This statement comes simply from an anonymous GM spokesperson
and does not represent any view specifically outlined in a GM manual, etc.
122. Wired News, supra note 1 (describing the concern of Lawrence Fried-
man, chairman of the Motor Vehicle Division of the Association of Trial Lawyers
of America).
123. See id.
124. See Auto Watch, Innovationhouse.com, at
http://www.innovationhouse.com/
products/autowatch.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2002).
125. See id.
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AutoWatch could be an extremely useful tool in lowering the
number of teens killed in car accidents because it enables
parents to monitor just how fast their teens are driving.
126
Additionally, when a child is being monitored, they will drive
more responsibly, since monitored drivers will drive less ag-
gressively.1 27 But while AutoWatch is an ideal device for par-
ents wishing to check up on their kids' speeding tendencies,
its application is severely limited in monitoring other safety
factors. Statistics show, for example, that every hour some-
one dies in America simply because they did not wear a seat
belt."' Black box technology could record this data, and much
more. Since 1994, sensors in GM cars have recorded informa-
tion such as whether the driver's seat belt was latched at the
time of a crash.29 This is critical information, for over seven-
teen states currently permit defendants in car crash cases to
limit damages if they can show that the plaintiff failed to
wear a seat belt.1
0
Insurance companies are also playing the black box
game, as Progressive Insurance, the nation's fifth-largest
auto insurer, has placed hundreds of monitoring devices in
customers' vehicles to measure how, when and where they
drive."' The device's patent describes a system of onboard
sensors that could track whether a driver signals before turn-
ing, tailgates or stops so sharply that anti-lock brakes en-
gage. This is in contrast with GM's black box, which only
records the last seconds before a crash. It also is different in
another important aspect: the customers of Progressive In-
126. See id. While AutoWatch has not been fully embraced by the general
public, there is no mistaking its value in encouraging good driving and safety
habits.
127. Autowatch: An Affordable Solution to the Problems of Vehicle Abuse and
Speeding, at http://www/obd2.con/autowatch/autowatch-parents.htm (last vis-
ited Mar. 17, 2002). AutoWatch is being marketed to parents not only as an in-
ducement to monitor children's driving habits, but to reduce wear and tear on
vehicles and lower maintenance costs. See id.
128. Seat Belts, American College of Emergency Physicians, at
http://www.acep.org/1,399,0.html (Jan. 1999).
129. Van Voris, supra note 81, at 1.
130. See id. (describing a statement made by the Insurance Institute for
Highway Safety).
131. Associated Press, Insurer's 'Black Box' Monitors Drivers, USA To-
day.com, at http://www.usatoday.comllife/cyber/tech/review/crg5 2 9 .htm (Nov.
23, 1999).
132. Id.
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surance, all in Texas, volunteered for the test program.'33 The
primary incentive is that customers can save up to 25% on in-
surance rates tailored to their individual driving habits, as
the company expects to benefit by getting new business from
consumers who like the idea of having some control over their
insurance rates and saving money. 3 4 Progressive Insurance,
however, is not installing black boxes for the utilitarian pur-
poses GM claims to be advocating. They are simply acting as
a vehicular watchdog, monitoring drivers in every aspect of
their performance. While certainly advantageous for the in-
surance company and those fortunate few able to save money
on their rates, the potential interest from the government in
getting access to this type of data may be destructive to our
society in the long run. As a leading opponent has pro-
nounced, you "can't create a swimming pool of data without
putting a fence around it."'35 With the amount of data prof-
fered by Progressive's black box, not even the world's largest
fence would be able to keep everything intact.
GM's black box could provide more efficient, accurate
resolution of car crash liability cases.'36 It could also revolu-
tionize safety and crash data, enabling manufacturers to cre-
ate more dependable cars.'37 Opponents of this technology
question the sincerity of this endeavor, but mere speculation
of privacy concerns should not inhibit the development of
such a pioneering device. First, unlike the flight data re-
corder found on airplanes, GM's airbag module is not a voice
recorder.'38 Second, when information is collected and used
for research, no one will be able to identify the person or vehi-
cle that is the source of an event.9 And most important is
recognition of the fact that the black box has the potential to
save lives. If ambulance crews could read the recorders on
the spot, they could determine whether a crash was severe
enough to cause head injuries.4 ° This would be extremely
valuable information because some head injuries become evi-
dent only hours after an accident, but with the capability of
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See Van Voris, supra note 81, at 1.
137. Id.
138. See Staab, supra note 39.
139. Wired News, supra note 1.
140. See Wald, supra note 4.
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the recorders, doctors would be alerted to watch for brain
swelling or other symptoms.
4
'
V. COMPLETE STANDARDIZATION: A PROPOSAL FOR THE Box
In order to make Rule 702 sympathetic to objective black
box data, the current rule should be amended to accommodate
standardization throughout the automotive industry.14 1 In
addition to the current amended Rule 702,' it is necessary to
draft a subsection incorporating both "reliability" and "uni-
formity" into the rule. For example, the modified rule could
be entitled "Standardization of Reliable Expert Testimony"
and provide: Testimony concerning the result or procedure of
a novel scientific technique is admissible provided: (1) the
technique has been standardized throughout the entire in-
dustry, (2) the validity of such technique has been tested
throughout the entire industry, and (3) the technique has
been proven to be reliable and produce accurate results.
This addition to Rule 702 would allow black box evidence
into the courtroom under extremely limited circumstances.
First, all automakers would be required to install the box in
every one of their vehicles. Second, all automakers would
need to have their boxes tested and verified for reliability.
Such an amended scientific testimony rule might appear even
harsher than Frye, but such safeguards are necessary in or-
der to prevent potential abuse. As one lawyer has com-
mented, for data recorders to be an essential instrument in
accident investigations, "information needs to come from all
vehicles involved in the collision."'" This amendment, while
at the present time keeping out all black box evidence derived
from a novel scientific technique, might very well push the
NTSB into regulating the automotive industry just as the
FAA has regulated airlines. 45  When two cars collide re-
searchers will then have the data from both vehicles to show
possible tailgating, speeding or other signs of bad driving."'
But until that time comes, courts and legislators must be vigi-
141. Id. Dr. Jeffrey Augenstein, a professor of surgery, has "been working
with GM to develop the recorders." Id.
142. See infra Part IV.C.
143. FED. R. EVID. 702 (As amended Apr. 17, 2000, eff. Dec. 1, 2000).
144. Cicchese, supra note 47.
145. FAA Flight Data Recorder Rule, 14 C.F.R. §129.20 (1964).
146. Wald, supra note 4.
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lant in their effort to keep this evidence out of the courtroom
until it has not only been standardized throughout the entire
automotive industry, but also proven to sustain accurate and
reliable results.
VI. CONCLUSION
Car crash specialists are quick to realize that the black
box could reform accident research. '47 Black boxes could also
revolutionize automobile design, insurance settlements, and
the way in which crash survivors are treated.18 Experts fore-
see the technology will grow to be as "standard as seat belts
and air bags in just a few years."'49 But what is not so evident
about the recovery of black box data is what will happen
when it is used as evidence in a lawsuit. So far, the govern-
ment has not imposed any standards for accuracy, making its
use as evidence in the courtroom potentially problematic." °
The arrival of black boxes in cars will not eliminate the need
for investigators.' Individuals will still have to interpret the
black box data, as the "new recorders will simply give investi-
gators another tool to do the job more expertly."'52 But the
manner in which these devices are interpreted could be
highly subjective.
For these reasons, black box technology in automobiles
creates an interesting dilemma. When an airplane crash oc-
curs, the flight data recorder tapes play a critical role in de-
termining the cause of the accident.' 5 Experts in this area
have the experience, training, and knowledge necessary to
analyze the data based on the reliable principles and methods
the NTSB has uniformly imposed.' In automobiles, however,
only the car manufacturer can download and decode data
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Wolfson, supra note 2.
150. Ferrar, supra note 6.
151. Id.
152. Id. The following scenario is given to support this statement: "If you're
on ice and skidding at 50 mph, the computer thinks you're going zero, because
the wheels aren't spinning. Yet you're really sliding along the ice at 50 mph."
Id.
153. See Cockpit Voice Recorders (CVR) and Flight Data Recorders, National
Transportation Safety Board Aviation Page, at
http://www.ntsb.gov/aviation/CVRFDR.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2002).
154. FED. R. EVID. 702.
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from its own boxes.'55 This has changed somewhat with the
introduction of Vetronix technology, as investigators, re-
searchers, and anyone else with a laptop can now interrogate
the box. 5' But if other automakers create their own version
of the black box, and Vetronix is unable to ascertain the re-
sults, the same problems will exist.
With no federal law regulating the use of black box re-
corders in automobiles, there is no uniform criterion for data
evaluation. 5 7  Using the "general acceptance" standard as
outlined in Frye has its complications, for a new scientific
method, although highly reliable, may not have a long enough
track record to allow scientists in the field to accept it gener-
ally.'58 Allowing expert testimony that is grounded in the re-
liable methods and procedures of science, as illustrated by
Federal Rule 702, is also problematic because there is no dis-
cernable procedure a manufacturer necessarily relies upon
when interpreting its own data. 9 For example, Toyota and
GM might analyze their data using different methods,
thereby producing dissimilar results, depending on whose
black box is presented as evidence. Therefore, until the black
box has become a staple in the automotive industry, with
each manufacturer subject to precise installation require-
ments, it should not be admissible in the courtroom. In this
way, the scientific community will have an objective basis by
which to verify the reliability and usefulness of black box re-
corders, and any specially trained expert in the automotive
field will be able to present such evidence to a jury.
155. Wald, supra note 4. Due to the novelty of this device, it is anticipated
that at some time in the future, any person with a laptop might be able to
interrogate the box. Id.
156. See supra Part II.B.
157. Ferrar, supra note 6 (describing that "the government has so far denied
petitions to make event recorders mandatory").
158. See supra Part IV.A.
159. See supra Part IV.A-B.
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